Critical
legal practice requires definition. There must be a clear set of principles
which govern it and which thereby provide a target for the practitioner.
I suggest:
- The
enactment of legislation that ensures social and economic justice, particularly
in relation to employment, housing, education and health.
- The
preservation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, particularly
speech, assembly, association and movement.
- The
provision of means to allow equal access to legal remedies and protections.
- The
construction of a legal process in which issues are fully and thoroughly
investigated and tried.
- The
development of a judicial and legal profession which is independent
of vested interest and reflects the matrix of the society which it serves.
There
is now an even greater need at the Bar for entrants who have these aspirations.
The past decade has witnessed wholesale erosion and destruction of social
and economic welfare such that there is now a substantial number of people
who are vulnerable and disadvantaged in the face of an authoritarian state.
At the same time there has been a relentless and co-ordinated attack on
every fundamental freedom, part of which has emanated from and found support
in the courts themselves.
The
most notable examples have been these: decisions restricting the right
to collective protest and demonstration followed by the draconian measures
contained in the Public Order Act 1986; the proposal to abolish the right
of silence; the endorsement of the broadcasting ban and the requirement
that journalists be forced to reveal their sources and, under PACE (the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984), to give up photographic and film
material to the police; the abolition of the 'public interest' defence
under the Official Secrets Act 1989; the trade union and employment legislation
(Employment Acts 1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990; Trade Union Act 1984) which
effectively emasculates any attempt at independent trade unionism; increasing
limitations on the right to jury trial and legal aid; and endorsements
of the government's Poll Tax philosophy which will eventually reverse
the time-honoured maxim of 'no taxation without representation".
Almost
in the same breath, support is professed for the struggle by Solidarity
and Lech Walesa's shipyard workers in Gdansk (Poland); for Civic Forum
and the force of mass demonstration led by Vaclav Havel In Wenceslas Square,
Czechoslovakia; for the resilience of the young people of the Intifada,
Palestine; and for the young people of the townships in South Africa who
struggle to penetrate the emergency legislation and media censorship.
Mining
communities in Yorkshire; print workers in Wapping; seafarers in Dover;
black communities in Netting Hill, Tottenham, and Liverpool; nationalist
communities in West Belfast; nurses, students and Poll-Tax protesters
in Trafalgar Square will all recognise the familiar symptoms.
Bearing
such an onslaught in mind, the critical lawyer who comes to the Bar must
be prepared to speak out, preferably in a collective fashion, to halt
the demolition of rights that have taken hundreds of years and lives to
develop and sustain. It is instructive to note that the only time that
many members of the higher judiciary and the Bar have been impelled to
take a public and collective stand was not in relation to the erosion
of these freedoms but in relation to the perceived threat to their territory
posed by the Lord Chancellor's Green Paper on the legal profession. Then
it was that reference was made for the first time to oppressive and authoritarian
government and to little men sporting armbands and toothbrush moustaches.
In
terms of collective action and analysis, the Critical Lawyers' Group provides
the broadest forum for lawyers from many different fields and is to be
encouraged to the full. To date there has been too much fragmentation
of effort and too much division between academics and practitioners. Members
of the Bar must be prepared to create close links with law departments
at universities and colleges so that the problems may be jointly addressed.
Those
within the profession must then actively endeavour to apply the critical
principles to their work. There are numerous wars in which this can occur.
The
casework undertaken should have particular regard to the needs of those
who are least able to articulate or protect themselves, such as those
subject to the complexities and arbitrariness of social security or immigration
law; those intimidated by the police station interview; those victimised
by corporate intransigence, and those isolated by racial prejudice.
The
preparation of cases should disregard the traditional view of minimising
contact with the client. It is essential that understanding and trust
become the hallmark. In this way, much can be done to restore public confidence
in a profession commonly seen to be Dickensian and obsessed with fees.
Close co-operation with solicitors, early delivery of papers, careful
research, collaboration with colleagues on approaches and points of law,
regular In-house seminars on the latest developments in the law (such
as the growth of judicial review): all are equally important.
These
initiatives should help to overcome the traditional attitude at the Bar
of insular individualism. The structure, method of working and organisation
of the profession all contribute to this attitude, which gives rise to
misjudgement, misunderstanding, pomposity and jealous competition. It
is for these same reasons that, from a personal standpoint, I favour fusion,
multidisciplinary partnerships and direct access.
There
are other pressing reasons for currently examining how barristers operate.
The main one is the recently reiterated threat to the provision of legal
aid. This has been the hidden agenda in both the Green and White Paper
proposals, which talk of flexibility and greater recourse to the private
and voluntary sectors. Essentially, this heralds the importation of market
forces and privatisation into yet another area of human welfare which
is clearly unsuitable for measurement on the profit gauge.
It
has to be remembered that there are already considerable areas where there
is no legal aid in any event, areas which touch upon what is most important
for most people and where they are most vulnerable - social security tribunals,
industrial tribunals, sex and racial discrimination, inquests, planning
and other forms of public enquiry.
The
advent of new technologies allows for a reappraisal of chambers and the
traditional working base. I would like to see the growth of consortia
or amalgams, comprising banisters, solicitors, researchers, para-social
workers and forensic science consultants, who through computerisation,
fax and DX (document exchange) facilities would be able to establish branches
in mayor cities. This is akin to the way some group medical practices
have developed. Such ideas are sturdily resisted by the Bar at present
and there is no prospect of implementation.
Without
these options there are decreasing avenues open to the critical lawyer
with limited financial resources. Deregulation may allow practice on a
temporary basis from a library. The emergence of the mega-set (40-50 counsel)
may give safety in numbers and commercial work may subsidise welfare work.
Neither of these is palatable. The first merely reinforces individualism,
while the second produces massive problems of internal management, identity
and unity. Both options deflect energy from the task of persuading central
Government to fund an adequate national service for legal welfare.
All
of this has to be set alongside the real and similar difficulties facing
organisations with related aims: Liberty (formerly NCCL), LAG, Amnesty,
Justice, ICCJ, Interrights, Haldane Society, FRU, Community Law Centres
and CABs. This should be a time for combination rather than a narrowing
concentration on specialities.
It
is also coincident with the imminence of new legal frontiers in 1992.
There has been hesitancy, reluctance and resistance by British courts
and lawyers to adopt the principles and codes of international status.
This has been most obvious in the field of human rights. A deaf
ear
is turned in domestic courts to references to UN charters or European
conventions. Few make use of channels of appeal at Strasbourg, but when
they do, often from the North of Ireland, they frequently
succeed. Britain has the worst human rights record at that court. Such
cases have far-reaching effects in exposing serious abuse, particularly
in the treatment of Irish issues. In one recent incident, the British
government disgracefully used derogation to escape the con-sequences of
a ruling (Brogan, December 1988).
Another
important example which merits legal action both in the UK and Europe
is the appalling conditions in British Prisons and the utter disregard
for prisoners' rights. We have one of the highest pro rata prison populations
in Europe, with consistent overcrowding above certified levels and lack
of integral sanitation, combined with arbitrary internal discipline and
absence of effective channels of communication and of discussion of grievances.
Successive governments have steadfastly refused to invoke an enforceable
code of minimum standards, despite its adoption by the United Nations
in 1955, the Council of Europe in 1973 and the representations of the
present HM Inspector of Prisons, the Prison Reform Trust, the Prison Officers'
Association, the Prison Governors' Association, NACRO, the House of Commons
All Party Committee on Prisons and the Howard League for Penal Reform.
The courts have likewise rejected arguments derived from such sources
as the European Standard Minimum rules. We now await with interest action
on the recommendations of the Woolf enquiry on prisons.
To
facilitate these legal battles, it is essential to have association and
co-operation with European critical lawyers who can assist with cases
here and in the European Courts. Chambers should have links in Europe
and reciprocal arrangements with European lawyers.
Even more intractable than the development of Chambers is the problem
of access to the Bar in the first place. There has only been a slight
change in the numbers and composition over the last 10-15 years. It remains
a small, tightly organised coterie of white middle-class males. Because
the judiciary are drawn mainly from the Bar, the same observation applies
there.
This
has serious repercussions for clients and cases. One fears that Lord Denning's
recent pronouncements about capital punishment being the antidote to miscarriages
of justice are not merely a reflection of his age but also of his class.
At the root of some of the most recently cited examples of miscarriages
of justice have been the strongly held beliefs and directions of the original
trial judges and of those judges who have heard the subsequent appeals.
Two
alterations far beyond those contemplated by the Lord Chancellor are required.
First, a separate career structure via a judicial college for judges under
the auspices of a Ministry of Justice. This would be a job on offer to
school-leavers like any other. Secondly, the rationalisation of legal
education and training so that students are not dependent on the chance
of a pupillage and still more a pupillage grant or loan.
Qualification,
however, is by no means the most serious hurdle. The present system permits
only slow and limited expansion. Sets of chambers are over-crowded and
normally only accept one or two new tenants per year.
The
CLG might consider promoting workshops for critical lawyers to discuss
the ways in which assistance with accommodation, libraries, finance and
management might meet the challenge of the 1990s, and ways to ensure the
application of an equal opportunities policy for women
and black entrants and for all those with limited resources.
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